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In early December, the U.S. President brought together the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a truce. He promised an end to years of warfare in the turbulent eastern DRC, describing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to generate significant profit.

Not long after, however, a completely opposite method for violence emerged. It was declared that U.S. forces had executed Christmas Day airstrikes in northwestern Nigeria, striking sites linked to the Islamic State (IS). On a online platform, the President stated, “I have previously warned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Defining Change of Direction

This dichotomy exemplifies the core tenet of the U.S. approach to sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a moving away from advocating for democracy and human rights in favor of a stated focus on economic deals and conflict resolution—even as this aligns with the emerging air campaign in Nigeria is yet unclear.

“Our view has shifted from Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a mantra commonly used for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” said a high-ranking U.S. state department official during a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

An administration representative stated this, saying the President “approaches Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Policy Impacts and Mixed Signals

This change is consequential, but experts warn it is too soon to assess its effects. The approach is intertwined with the President’s unconventional diplomacy, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and negative rhetoric towards Africans.

“The guiding idea is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” explained an analyst for Africa studies at a prominent foreign policy council.

Notable policy moves have included:

• Shutting down the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. Research estimates this could lead to millions of additional deaths globally by 2030, with a sizable share in Africa.
• Implementing visa restrictions on citizens from more than two dozen African countries and stopping most refugee admissions.
• Implementing a global tariff campaign that has adversely affected African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Geopolitical Neglect and Strains

In contrast to his predecessors, the President did not travel to sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known comment on African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a crude epithet, which he later admitted using.

“Africa clearly runs dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” said the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which devoted only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A major feud has erupted with South Africa, reportedly shaped by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The narrative of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa resonates strongly now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” commented a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Business-Like Relations and Conditional Action

A comparable tension flared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This ran up against Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and suffering from security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts noted that the stern rhetoric may have spurred the government into more responsiveness on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had consented to the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has been open his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and sent an envoy to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal was reportedly broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” argued one conflict expert.

Similar to Other Powers

Observers characterize the new U.S. approach as reminiscent of that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have increased their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on commercial interests.

“It represents a belated recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” said one foreign policy analyst.

Realistically, the revised strategy likely means that “a state that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The engagement that we are talking about is not aimed at spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a transactional posture towards Africa,” the observer stated.